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Abstract  
In order to ensure that the information and knowledge needed 
for the management of healthcare is appropriately shared, 
human behavior within health care organizations (HCOs) 
needs to be carefully analyzed. Hence, guidelines, protocols, 
and messaging standards must be combined with models of 
resources and processes of patient care that are based on a 
sound ontology of organizations. This requires a general 
theory of the ontology of social institutions. Among the many 
groups attempting to develop efficient ways of sharing 
information across healthcare systems and organizations is 
Health Level 7 (HL7). Here I address the question whether 
HL7 reflects a sound analysis of behavior within HCOs on the 
basis of a sound ontology of organizations. I then apply 
ontological principles designed to show how the Reference 
Information Model (RIM) might be modified in such a way as 
to support efficient communication of medical information 
within and between healthcare organizations.  
Keywords: Ontology, Speech Acts, HL7 RIM, Electronic 
Health Record 
Introduction 
There are many efforts underway to develop efficient ways of 
sharing information across healthcare systems and 
organizations. One prominent effort is that of the Health Level 
7 (HL7). HL7 does not focus exclusively on the requirements 
of one area of healthcare such as pharmacy, medical devices, 
imaging or insurance (claims processing) transactions, but 
extends its remit to the interface requirements of the entire 
healthcare system. This has inspired the development of a 
powerful abstract model of healthcare called the Reference 
Information Model (RIM).  
In order to develop guidelines for the management of 
information and knowledge within HCOs we need a careful 
analysis of human behavior within HCOs. Hence guidelines, 
protocols and messaging standards must be combined with 
representations of resources and processes of patient care that 
are based on a sound ontology of organizations. This will in 
turn require a general ontology of social institutions. The 
present paper outlines the basis of such an organizational 
ontology, starting with the theory of speech acts. It then applies 
this ontology to the HL7 RIM, drawing conclusions for the 
efficient communication and management of medical 
information and knowledge within and between healthcare 
organizations, paying special attention to the role that medical 
documents play in organizational reality. 
The Ontology of Health Care Organizations 
An HCO is a structure that is created and maintained through 
the actions of the participants involved and designed to support 
the over arching goal of patient care. In order to appreciate how 
human actions can provide the ontological glue that binds 
organizations together we need to shed light on some features 
of social reality that often go unnoticed. The neglect of these 
features, though, is no small matter. Polanyi recognized an 
important distinction between explicit knowledge and tacit 
knowledge [1].  Explicit knowledge typically comes in the 
form of propositions and as such is relatively easy to translate 
into a language that a computer can read. Tacit knowledge, on 
the other hand, involves knowing how to do something and is 
much more difficult to put into a form that a computer can 
understand without a considerable loss of information. The 
difficulty of extracting and eliciting tacit knowledge is due in 
part to what has been called the knowledge engineering 
paradox. The more expertise one has, the more tacit the 
knowledge and so the harder it is to extract this knowledge for 
purposes of formalization in a knowledge repository. There 
exists, then, a definite need to pay closer attention to the ways 
that agents interact, pick-up and share information and 
knowledge within an HCO. An ontology of organizations that 
is maximally representative of organizational reality is an 
essential tool for those attempting to develop standards and 
guidelines for interoperability between healthcare information 
services.  
Speech Acts in HCOs: The Case of the Promise 
Philosophers have since Aristotle focused primarily on one sort 
of language use, statements. Austin [2] and Searle [3] saw that 
what we can do with words goes beyond simply stating facts 
about the world. We can make requests, ask questions, give 
orders, make promises, give thanks, offer apologies, and so on, 
all of which are uses of language that go beyond the statement-
making sort and are such that the corresponding utterance brings about some result in reality. A sound ontological 
analysis of HCOs should not only identify the sorts of speech 
acts that are common to HCOs, it should also identify the sorts 
of entities that are brought into being by speech acts as well as 
the specific types of context in which those speech acts occur. 
A systematic account of all the sorts of speech acts found in 
HCOs would be beyond the scope of this paper. Our analysis of 
speech acts will begin, instead, with a discussion of one central 
example, namely the promise.  
One of the salient features of speech acts in general and of 
promises in particular is that they are social acts and as such 
involve at least two people. Speech acts are for this reason 
opposed to (intentional) solitary acts such as the rehearsal of a 
difficult medical procedure in ones head. Every promise 
involves two parties: the promiser and the promisee. In the 
simplest cases of promising, one person makes a promise to 
another. In more complex cases, a group of individuals may 
play the role of promiser or promisee. For example, a physician 
might make a promise to a patient’s family, or a group of 
physicians might make a promise to an individual patient or, 
even, the patient’s family. We will restrict our discussion, 
though, to the simple cases of promising.  
In order for a successful issuance of a promise to occur four 
core conditions must be satisfied. First, the promiser must 
make an outward expression that can be recognized as a 
promise by others, most of the time this simply involves an 
utterance to the effect ‘I promise to do F’. Second, the promiser 
must have the appropriate intentional content, i.e., the intention 
to do F. It is not enough to simply utter the words, the utterance 
must also indicate a genuine intention on the part of the 
promiser to do F; otherwise, it is a sham promise. Third, the 
utterance is in need of what Austin termed uptake [2]. The 
promisee must register the outward expression, e.g. the 
utterance, as a promise. Fourth, the promisee must consent to 
the promiser doing F; otherwise the act might be construed as a 
threat.  
In addition to these four core conditions, there are some 
additional background conditions that are especially important 
to an understanding of speech acts within the context of HCOs. 
In some cases the promiser must have the authority to promise 
to do F. Likewise the promisee must have the authority to 
accept or decline F. For instance, only some healthcare 
personnel have the authority to promise a patient a certain 
medical procedure, likewise only under certain circumstances 
does the guardian of a patient have the authority to grant 
permission for a medical procedure or treatment. Another 
condition is that there should exist no previous commitments 
on the part of the promiser or the promisee that would vitiate 
the promise. For example, a previous promise to perform a 
medical procedure can vitiate a subsequent promise to perform 
some other medical service at that time. And finally, there must 
be a general background of trust for the promise to hold. 
Without this the entire social practice of making promises 
would not work. If all these conditions are met, then the 
promise gives rise to successor states: an obligation on the part 
of the promiser and to an exactly corresponding claim on the 
part of the promisee. Promises are also associated with a 
tendency to be realized, which means that a promise is not 
merely directed to a future action F but that it is bound up with 
a chain of physical processes ensuing from it.  
This brief discussion of promises, based on [4], already makes 
explicit many of the sorts of entities that are involved in 
knitting together that complex whole that is an HCO: the 
participants of speech acts, the speech acts themselves, the 
relations between participants, the speech acts and their 
relations of authority, entities such as obligations and claims, 
and the relation to physical processes and to future states of 
affairs. This account would still not be complete without an 
account of the modifications of speech acts such as sham 
assertions (e.g. forged signatures), speech acts performed in 
someone else’s name (e.g. representation, delegation), speech 
acts with multiple addresses and even conditional speech acts.  
Institutional Facts 
Searle distinguishes between brute facts and institutional facts 
[3, 5]. Brute facts exist independently of any human 
institutions. It is a brute fact, for example, that a certain 
patient’s temperature is 99.8 degrees. The statement that the 
patient’s temperature is 99.8 degrees requires the institution of 
language and an institution of measuring temperature in 
degrees, but the fact stated, that the patient has a certain 
temperature, exists independently of any institution [5, p.27]. 
Institutional facts, on the other hand, require special human 
institutions for their very existence. It is an institutional fact, 
for example, that a given person is a physician, since it is only 
within the context of certain institutions that a persons counts 
as a physician. 
Searle introduces a distinction between two kinds of rules in 
order to understand the nature of these institutions [3, 5]. 
Regulative rules, as the name suggests, merely regulate 
antecedently existing forms of behavior such as rules of polite 
table behavior regulate the activity of eating. Constitutive rules, 
in contrast, do not merely regulate; they also create or define 
new forms of behavior. The rules of chess, for instance, create 
the very possibility of our engaging in the type of activity we 
call playing chess. Constitutive rules have the basic form: 
  X counts as Y in context C. 
The full significance of the formula as analytic tool for 
understanding the ontology of HCOs requires further 
understanding how humans impose functions on phenomena 
where the function cannot be achieved solely in virtue of 
physics and chemistry but requires continued human 
cooperation in specific forms of recognition, acceptance, and 
acknowledgement of a new status in order for the function to 
be realized [5]. Searle labels these status functions. Consider 
the difference between a scalpel and a medical prescription. A 
scalpel can perform its function of making precise incisions 
simply in virtue of its physical nature (the sharpness of the 
blade). The same cannot be said of a prescription. A 
prescription viewed purely physically is just a piece of paper 
with ink marks on it. Viewed institutionally it is much more. 
For one, the prescription provides the holder with the power to 
purchase certain medical substances. Clearly this goes beyond 
the purely physical powers of paper and ink. The reason for 
this is that humans have the capacity to impose status functions 
upon entities that they would not otherwise have. In such cases, 
they have these powers in certain contexts were the appropriate 
constitutive rules obtain.  The imposition of status functions on physical entities—which 
is a speech act—is important to understanding how human 
actions can create, maintain, and alter the structure of an HCO. 
By acting in accordance with constitutive rules we are able to 
impose certain rights, duties, obligations on our fellow human 
beings and on the reality around us. Offices, positions, roles, 
prescriptions, orders, and so on, are all institutional objects that 
can only realize their function because humans collectively 
treat these objects in ways that these objects could not perform 
exclusively in virtue of their physical properties. 
Some Formal Ontological Distinctions 
A number of formal ontological distinctions are important for 
an understanding of the ontology of organizations [6]. First, 
there exists a distinction between continuants and occurrents. 
Continuants are entities which continue to exist through time: 
they preserve their identity from one moment to the next even 
while undergoing a variety of different sorts of changes. The 
principal mark of a continuant is that, if it exists at a time, then 
so also do all of its parts. Examples include healthcare 
personnel, medical supplies, and contexts, e.g. specific wards 
in a hospital. Occurrents (also called events, activities, 
processes) are in contrast never such as to exist in full in any 
single instant of time; rather, they are such as to unfold 
themselves in their successive phases, in the way in which, for 
example, the performance of a medical procedure unfolds itself 
through time. Occurrents characteristically have a beginning, a 
middle and an end. In contrast to continuants, occurrents are 
such that their parts are never present at a single time. 
Examples include the circulation of blood or the course of a 
disease, collective actions such as surgery, and institutional 
acts such as making contracts. The relation between 
continuants and occurrents is important to the ontology of 
HCOs, which involve both at a multiplicity of levels. 
Healthcare personnel (continuants) consume, make contracts 
and requests that bring about a changes in the states of affairs 
of an HCO; they are involved with patients (a second group of 
continuants) in yet further speech acts and also in the physical 
processes associated therewith. 
Second, there exists a distinction between independent and 
dependent entities. Independent entities (e.g. humans, surgical 
equipment, the buildings that house healthcare activities, etc.) 
have an inherent ability to exist without the support from other 
entities. Dependent entities, in contrast, require the support of 
other entities in order to exist. Third, there exists a distinction 
between institutional entities that coincide with some portion of 
physical reality and those that do not [7, 8]. The former include 
such entities as physicians, patients, medical documents and so 
on. The latter include relations of authority, obligations, claims 
and so on. To understand this, consider a promise. The physical 
act of uttering (the X term in the corresponding constitutive 
rule) counts as a promise (the Y term) in a certain context C. 
The act of promising coincides with the physical event, the 
utterance. But once the promise is successful there arises a 
corresponding obligation and claim. At this point there exists 
no portion of physical reality with which the successor states 
can be said to coincide. In virtue of what, then, do these entities 
exist? The answer is: records. In informal situations, the 
memories of the participants are often enough, but in formal, 
legal situations records, whether paper based or electronic, are 
that which sustain in existence the non-physical relations, 
claims, obligations, relations of authority, and so forth which 
glue an HCO together.  
Speech acts, which are themselves events, are a major source 
of organizational change. The ontology of HCOs, then, needs 
to distinguish between organizational continuants and 
organizational occurrents. Organizational continuants can be 
divided further into those that exist independently of human 
contexts and those that exist in virtue of them. The former 
entities include humans, buildings and bodily organs. The latter 
include those entities such as doctors and clinical wards that 
coincide with physical objects or events and provide the 
scaffolding which supports those abstract entities that bind 
together an organization – entities which are do not coincide 
with any portion of physical reality, but are still tied to contexts 
of human behavior. This non-physical (institutional) 
superstructure of the HCO includes all those entities that exist 
as consequences of speech acts and documents: offices, roles, 
licenses, prohibitions, rights, laws, and debts as well as the 
successor states of speech acts that depend on documents for 
their continued existence, such as obligations and claims. The 
ontology of continuants in an HCO reflects a similar division 
between physical processes on the one hand (including 
processes of speaking and hearing, but also clinical and disease 
processes) and institutional processes (including the speech 
acts that are prevalent in HCOs and their institutional 
consequences).  
The HL7 RIM from an Ontological Point of View 
The purpose of this discussion is to show how certain 
important ontological distinctions are blurred in the HL7 RIM 
and, more specifically, how this failure obscures the important 
ontological role that documents play in HCOs in sustaining the 
existence of such abstract entities as obligations and claims—
the ontological glue of organizations. 
The “Backbone” Classes of the RIM 
The RIM consists of six “back-bone” classes: Act, Entity, Role, 
Participation, ActRelationship, RoleLink [9, A.1.5]. The Act 
class comprehends all intentional actions documented by a 
healthcare professional in either a clinical or administrative 
context that has happened, can happen, is happening, is 
intended to happen, or is requested/demanded to happen. The 
Entity class includes those sorts of physical things or groups of 
physical things which can participate in an action as 
perpetrator, target or beneficiary such as people, organizations, 
medical tools and supplies, etc. (On the surface, these two 
classes appear to parallel our distinction between occurrents 
and continuants, but on closer examination this turns out not to 
be the case.) In the RIM, an entity which participates in an act 
must do so in a particular Role. The Role defines the entity’s 
competency (which actions it can perform) and constraints 
(which actions it cannot perform).  
Whereas a role may be said to delimit the possible actions that 
an entity may perform, the Participation class associates 
entities-in-a-role with specific acts in which they are involved. Participation, then, is limited to a particular Act, as opposed to 
Role, which defines the competency of an entity irrespective of 
any particular act. The RoleLink  class defines connections 
between roles. For example, The RIM links the roles of 
‘patient’ and ‘provider’ to one another, since there exists a 
dependency between those roles. And just as roles are related 
to one another, so too are Acts. An ActRelationship  is an 
association between a pair of acts. Sometimes an 
ActRelationship represents a relationship between two distinct 
acts such as an order to make some observation and the 
observation event that occurs in response to this order. In other 
cases, the ActRelationship represents the relations between 
within an act. Acts can be decomposed into further sub-acts 
and the ActRelationship class is designed to capture these 
relations as well.  
The Act-Centered View of Healthcare 
In the healthcare field there exists an abundance of acts 
performed by humans: a clinical observation, an assessment of 
a health condition, treatment services (such as medication, 
surgery, and psychological therapy), assisting, monitoring or 
attending, training and education services to patients and their 
next of kin, notary services (such as the formation of advanced 
directives or living wills), editing and maintaining documents, 
and many others. Some of these such as the formation of 
advanced directives are what we have referred to as speech 
acts, others such as treatment services are not.  
The concept of act plays a central role in the HL7 RIM, since 
all information and processes in the healthcare domain are 
represented primarily in terms of the acts performed within an 
organizational context. The authors of the HL7 RIM defend an 
act-centered view of healthcare with the argument that any 
profession or business, including healthcare, primarily consists 
of a series of attributable, intentional actions, performed and 
recorded by responsible actors. It is easy to see how healthcare 
may be said to consist largely of intentional or purposeful 
actions. It is less clear, though, by what is meant by 
‘attributable’. At one level of representation, we might wish to 
represent the intentional actions performed by the participants 
in an HCO. At another level of representation, we might wish 
to represent not the actual intentional acts but what has been 
said or reported about them. It is this second level of 
representation that the authors of the HL7 RIM argue is the 
proper level of representing HCOs. In effect, then, what the 
authors of the RIM claim is that the proper level for modeling 
healthcare is not at the level of what is the case, but what is 
said to be the case.  
The author’s of the HL7 RIM take the act-centered view of 
healthcare and extend it to medical records. Medical records 
consists of what clinicians have said about what they have 
heard, seen, thought and done and do not directly document 
what actually occurs in a given situation; instead inferences 
must be made about what was “true” on the basis of these 
observations. The truth of the real world then is constructed 
through a combination (and arbitration) of such attributed 
statements only, and there is no class in the RIM whose objects 
represent “objective states of affairs” or “real processes” 
independent of attributed statements [3.1.1]. No direct 
reference is made to natural events such as a patient’s 
heartbeat, since every act must be an act that can be attributed 
to someone. Thus a patient’s heartbeat may be recorded as 
observed, but there is no record of the event itself; there is, 
however, a record of the observation by, say, a physician.  
Criticisms  
Several criticisms can be offered up against the act-centered 
view of healthcare forwarded by the authors of the HL7 RIM. 
Criticism 1: Speech acts are not attributed acts. The Act-class 
extends beyond attributed factual statements to embrace the 
full range of speech acts: “Act as statement or speech-act are 
the only representation of real world facts or processes in the 
HL7 RIM” [3.1.1]. The inclusion of speech acts into the HL7 
RIM is understandable, since speech acts, unlike factual 
statements, stand in systematic relations not only to other acts, 
but also relate in specific ways to the roles and relations of 
authority that participants have in HCOs. For example, the 
simple act of observing a resident attend to a patient is not 
linked to any other acts in the same specific way that, say, the 
act of ordering a blood test is linked to the act of performing 
the blood test. In the case of the latter, if the recipient of the 
blood test order understands the order, the recipient is obligated 
ceteris paribus to perform the test. No such obligation exists in 
the former case. A speech act, though, is not a representation of 
a real world event—it is a real world event. Speech acts bring 
about some result in the world. Reports about speech acts, in 
contrast, do not. So, either the HL7 RIM makes references to 
real world facts and processes, in which case all the talk about 
attributed acts is misleading, or it does not make any such 
reference, in which case the Act class does not embrace speech 
acts. 
Criticism 2: The RIM does not track the distinction between 
continuants and occurrents. According to the HL7 RIM a 
‘collection of information’ (e.g. a medical record) is not an 
instance or a subclass of Entity, but is instead considered a 
collection of attributed Acts [(1.3)]. Elsewhere the RIM lists 
several characteristics of a clinical document: (1) persistence – 
a clinical document continues to exist in an unaltered state, for 
a time period defined by local and regulatory requirements; (2) 
Stewardship – a clinical document is maintained by a person or 
organization entrusted with its care [See 3.1.1.1 ActClass]. 
This is ontologically confused: First, persistence is a 
characteristic of continuants and not of acts. A clinical 
document exists in total at a given time, it does not unfold 
through successive stages over time. Second, a person cannot 
maintain a collection of attributed acts in any way one might be 
said to maintain a document. This is important, since attributed 
acts cannot be filled, stored, updated and so on, all of which are 
things that can be true of documents. Documents, on the other 
hand, serve as traces or records of past acts. The failure to 
distinguish between acts (occurrents) on the one hand and 
documents (continuants) on the other reveals that the RIM does 
not track the distinction between continuants and occurrents. 
As a result the information that comes with the tracking this 
distinction is lost.  
Criticism 3: The RIM needs a more principled account of 
actions. Consider the case of contracts. According to the RIM a 
contract is an act and is defined as follows: an agreement of 
obligation between two or more parties that is subject to contractual law and enforcement. Our previous ontological 
analysis of speech acts reveals that several important 
distinctions are overlooked here. First, there is the complex 
speech act (an occurrent) that brings about the contract. 
Second, there is the obligation between parties (continuants), 
and the document (a physical entity) that records the existence 
of the obligation. These distinctions are important to track, 
since speech acts, their successor states, and the documents that 
record their existence all, so to speak, behave differently from 
one another.  
In order to understand the relation between a speech act and the 
associated future action or state of affairs to which it is 
directed, it is important to understand the structure of the 
speech act (this is something that certain instances of the 
ActRelationship is intended to capture). It is only if the 
structure of the speech act in question is understood that one 
will be able to see how modifications to different aspects of 
that structure will be associated with different future actions 
and states of affairs respectively. So long as the HL7 RIM does 
not have an adequate ontology of speech acts and HCOs its 
attempts to model the relations between speech acts will fall 
sort of being systematic, since it lacks any principled way of 
treating this acts. 
Conclusion 
Researchers in medical informatics recognize the importance 
of developing health information systems that are sensitive to 
the way intentional agents interact not only with one another 
but also with their surroundings [10, 11, 12]. There exists a 
definite need, then, to pay closer attention to the tacit 
dimension of knowledge, the way humans interact, pick-up and 
share information and knowledge in HCOs. In turn, traditional 
approaches to knowledge management, i.e. knowledge 
acquisition, representation, and transfer, need to be combined 
with an ontology of HCOs that is maximally representative of 
organizational reality. The ontology of HCOs can map out 
those provinces of the reality of HCOs which are a part of 
physical reality and those which exist because and to the extent 
that there are documents to sustain their existence. Likewise, it 
can provide principled ways for recognizing those entities such 
as doctors and clinical wards that coincide with physical 
objects or events and provide the scaffolding which supports 
those abstract entities that are brought into existence by the 
appropriate speech and bind together an organization—entities 
which not do not correspond to any portion of physical reality, 
but are still tied to contexts of human behavior.  
Attempts such the HL7 will be greatly improved if more effort 
is brought to bear on understanding the ontological nature of 
healthcare organizations. The neglect of objective states of 
affairs and real processes, the failure to distinguish properly 
between acts and documents and more generally the neglect of 
the  context within which messages are conveyed places 
obstacles in the way of an adequate ontology of healthcare 
organizations of the sort which is needed for effective 
knowledge management.  
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